The state of China as the Olympics begin

United behind the spectacle, the nation, and the chance to buy stuff.

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I write this as the Olympics get under way in 北京/Beijing, and 中国/China begins its "coming-out party to the world". Thus far coverage in the American media has been execrable, dwelling almost exclusively on Beijing's pollution and the "rights violation" of not allowing foreign reporters access to a handful of English-language websites. Time has also been found, of course, to report on important issues like whether government restrictions would make the Olympics "no fun" for foreign visitors and the pole-dancing craze sweeping the world of bourgeois Chinese women's fitness. When articles touching on the key issues facing China today have appeared, like this one on the eviction of many of the workers whose labor has created the Beijing cityscape but who will never enjoy what they built, or this one on China's macroeconomic juggling act, they've been superficial and completely failed to capitalize on this unprecedented opportunity to educate Americans on China's complex reality.

It's hardly surprising, tho. Concentrating on individuals and ephemeral "events" that float ahistorically in the the present, at the expense of deep contextual or structural understanding, is precisely the model of mainstream journalism. Yet the media can do - and have done - a much better job than this. Witness the outstanding New York Times series a couple years ago on the massive social tensions among the winners and losers of China's reform era. At the time I summarized and expanded on these articles and also wrote a broader critique. These are worth going back and reading, because such structurally induced conflicts remain at the root of China's tense social situation.

The Western media's obsession with "human rights" (in their usage, little more than free speech and elections) has massively distorted their portrayal of the Chinese situation. As despicable as is the persecution of internet dissidents and the like, the most serious rights violations in China today are tied to the violence created by free market competition. Severe labor exploitation, repression of independent unions, inadequate access to healthcare, unequal access to schooling, expropriation of peasants' land for development schemes, subjection to horrific pollution - these are the pressing injustices in China, and they are all variations on the theme of class warfare.

The Western media, having served as continuous cheerleader for market reforms over the course of three decades, is constitutionally incapable of recognizing this. Instead, severe class tensions are absorbed within the fatuous formulation of a "liberalizing economy alongside and an authoritarian polity". American writers evince no end of bewilderment at such a paradox. Yet if they examined the history of the last two hundred years, they might discover that in each and every case harsh authoritarianism has accompanied the early stages of capitalist accumulation. Workers do not quietly accept being dominated, at least not until relentless repression and the lure of consumerism work their magic.

To cope with these increasingly stark social contradictions, the Chinese state and its allies in the emerging capitalist class have resorted to an old formula: channel popular anxiety and rage into passions that unite those with power and those without it. For the moment, xenophobic nationalism and a putative shared culture - the most powerful examples used by many ruling elites over the last two centuries - are actually being given a relatively low profile in these efforts. Right now, none other than the Olympics is the focus of attempts to repress class conflict. The Olympics serves first as spectacle, a latter-day bread and circuses. Second, it has been promoted with almost messianic enthusiasm as a symbol of China's rise. Every citizen has been encouraged to take pride in the nation, as China's leaders have obsessively sought out whatever amenities (fancy hotels, striking buildings, immaculate toilets) are thought to command respect in the international realm. Finally, the Olympics are the focus of that other great desire that unites the entire nation - endless accelerating consumption.

How the quest to avoid class conflict will proceed after the Olympics is a hugely important question, for Chinese culture, politics, and international relations alike. The fleeting unity forged by the Olympics may be sorely tested in the next year or two if the rich countries sink into prolonged recession, causing China's export markets to contract and unemployment to rise. Yet aggressive nationalism probably cannot provide immediately relief - China has staked its international reputation (in striking contrast to the United States) on a "peaceful rise", and the ideological groundwork for a more muscular imperialism has yet to be laid.

If unrest starts to increase, the state will probably make tactical concessions, and may even start the shift from export-oriented development to concentrating on developing the internal market. Fortunately for Chinese capitalism, the state retains a powerful role in the economy and can respond far more rationally - in the interests of capitalists as a class - than would individual capitalists, who would no doubt prefer ever more brutal repression. The victims of the market have little capacity to produce something more radical - they remain extremely fragmented and the only group that might overcome this, the intellectuals, still fear them more than the state. Thus far, protesters have only infrequently turned to the rich history of revolutionary China as a resource in challenging the radical inequalities that have emerged in the reform period. But if the intellectuals find their social position deteriorating and some join the popular movement, this history could become a powerful weapon against the Chinese "Communist" Party and its capitalist running dogs.

The 20th century's record on rising powers: Two world wars and the Cold War. How will the 21st century turn out?

The question has been raised in the comments whether there’s any chance at all that 中国/China and the USA will move toward conflict. As everyone knows, bourgeois democracy is dominated by commercial elites, and the most powerful American companies all support engagement over containment. The progress of the debate over granting China permanent “normal trade relations” in 2000 provides a lot of support for the idea. Commercial interests, piously cloaking themselves in the crackpot idea that expanded trade would cause political liberalization, steamrolled human rights, labor, and security concerns.

Yet American elites are far more divided on how to approach China than the relative calm in the media would seem to indicate. Certainly the dominant faction, based in multinational industrial and finance capital, wants to avoid confrontation so as to continue exploiting Chinese labor and taking advantage of China's weak environmental regulations. But an insistent minority based in the security bureaucracy and domestic industry view China as America's most important enemy. And that minority is likely to gain strength as China does.

You can see hints of the “China threat” group in the widespread Congressional criticism of China's exchange rate policies and the outburst that killed the 中海油/CNOOC offer on Unocal in 2006. For a better idea of these people’s solid presence in the halls of power, just skim thru some of the testimony and reports of the Congressionally mandated US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which every year warns about the growing threat from China. Support for anti-China policies is already quite deep, if not yet very broad.

It'll be interesting to see the military/small capitalist faction battle it out with the big capitalist faction - it's not a conflict that too often makes it into the light of day. Right now the engagement group has the upper hand - altho Cheney, like Clinton before him, has been quietly encircling China with military bases even as the US speaks the language of trade and cooperation. There are two things that make me worry about long-term conflict. First, any sudden crisis (over 台湾/Taiwan, say) would immediately destroy all the leverage of the accommodationists. And we shouldn’t kid ourselves - the United States will go to war to deny Taiwan to China.

Second, US economic interests in China will probably start to decline relatively soon. The Chinese government only tolerates foreign investment because it needs the capital and access to technology. China is fast catching up on technology, and if the Chinese economy can make the transition from export-led growth to sustained growth driven by domestic consumption - which I think it will - American companies will find a less inviting market. Those companies might leave on their own anyway, in search of even cheaper labor - many are already starting to move to Việt Nam.

Just think about the anti-Japan panic of the early '90s - a nearly hysterical fear gripped the whole country before the bursting of the bubble economy abruptly ended the Japan "threat". Now consider what's going to happen when China starts to pose strong competition not only economically, but in diplomatic and military affairs as well.

On the Chinese side as well, there are strong pressures toward confrontation. Popular nationalism is so strong that the government would have to take a hard line on any international crisis - especially over Taiwan - even if it didn’t want to. Chinese people themselves have almost no awareness that their country is rapidly assuming the role of imperialist power, and even less of a critical stance toward that fact. Nor do they understand the colonial character of Chinese policy in Tibet (西藏/Xizang) and شەرقىي تۈركىستان/Sherqiy Türkistan (新疆/Xinjiang), and they interpret international criticism of those crimes as a form of aggression.

Most important, China is in the midst of a capitalist revolution, which necessarily creates massive inequalities and constant cultural instability. For many people, the anxieties created by this process will be displaced onto the international sphere, and a reactionary nationalism will fill the void of ideology and provide an anchor in the turmoil wrought by commodification. For elites, nationalism is a useful direction to channel popular grievances into, and popular support for imperialism will soon enough become a necessary condition for expanding profitability.

So for the moment, capitalism prevents conflict - but in the long run it will probably require it. Maybe this time the USA will deal better with a rising power than it did with the Soviet Union after the war, or than Britain did with rising Germany in the early 20th century. But I doubt it.

Nationalism and competitiveness

To: Brent Staples
Re: "Why American College Students Hate Science"

You write:
"[If we don't prioritize the training of scientists], America is unlikely to preserve its privileged position in an increasingly competitive and science-based global economy."

Since you frequently and insightfully write about race in America, I was surprised and disappointed by this line of argument. Would you accept a white person who called on other whites to train white students in order to outcompete other races? I doubt it - I assume you'd argue that racial competition is harmful and leads to racial supremacy, that the answer is not intensified competition but an end to racism and the establishment of real equality.

Is there a difference between this kind of competitive racial thinking and the nationalism you draw on to make your argument? Is fighting to keep your nation on top really any different from fighting to keep your race on top? Is American supremacy any less objectionable than white supremacy?

Call for a culture war

The election’s finally over, and there’s no denying it: Republicans won. They decisively won the presidency (Bush even got the most votes this time); they significantly strengthened their hold on the Senate; they preserved their majorities in the House and the governors’ mansions. They overwhelmingly won 11 state referenda banning gay marriage. And they did all this in the face of a huge increase in voter participation, the Democrats’ first major grassroots election drive in decades, and George Bush’s record of lies and incompetence in office.

How did they pull it off? Exit polls identify four major issues that were important to voters: “moral values” (22 percent), “terrorism” (19 percent), jobs and the economy (20 percent), and the war in Iraq (15 percent). Eighty percent of those choosing one of the first two as their top issue voted for Bush, a similar number picking one of the second two as their top issue voted for Kerry.

In other words, Republicans lost overwhelmingly on Iraq and the economy, but won overwhelmingly on terrorism and “values”. That means the Republican message of fear and aggression against foreigners (what they call the war on terrorism) and their assault against gay rights, abortion rights, and the separation of church and state are deeply attractive to most Americans.

The first step in dealing with popular support for a reactionary agenda is recognizing its foundation. Social conservatism is not merely “false consciousness” or a Republican trick to secure support for tax cuts. People who oppose gay rights have just as much a stake in preventing gay marriage as they do in protecting their job. Their cultural and gender identity rests on the continued repression of gays, and an end to that repression is deeply threatening - often threatening in a much more intimate way than losing a job could ever be. This is why the “values” platform can be so compelling.

Support for the administration’s anti-“terrorism” policies is perhaps even more perplexing to progressives who know about its record of security and intelligence incompetence and overseas brutality. But most Americans are rooted in an extremely strong culture of hostility to and fear of foreigners, and belief in America’s benign influence. The 9/11 attacks brought these latent feelings to the surface, and along with Bush’s lies and the media’s broad complicity have sustained strong support for the administration’s foreign policies. Together with the successful longterm effort of Republicans to brand Democrats as soft on foreign threats, “terrorism” became a major advantage for Bush.

Progressives have two options in response to Republicans’ strength on “values” and security issues. They can move to the right (as they steadily have on economic issues for the last 25 years) or they can start a culture war of their own.

Democratic politicians and operatives, motivated by a short-term desire to win, will probably move to the right. But trying to out-Republican the Republicans has more often than not been a losing strategy, and when it has worked (as under Clinton), it proved a hollow victory. A better course is to face the cultural intolerance of Americans head-on in a long-term attempt to neutralize the only advantages Republicans have.

What does this mean? For starters, it means making gay rights a leading part of the agenda. Not just the fight for gay marriage, but demanding absolute acceptance of all queer lifestyles from all Americans. Thirty years ago a similar cultural fight, demanding equality for women, was launched. Today that equality is not yet a reality, but few people still question the principle. Elections are no longer won demonizing man-hating feminists. If the Democrats turn right and forsake the gay rights agenda, it won’t just represent a defeat for the principle of equality. It will also mean conceding in perpetuity an election issue to the Republicans. Democrats will never be able to position themselves as more intolerant, but they might eventually be able to neutralize the issue.

We face a similar fight against Americans’ nationalism and the imperial culture at home that consistently supports U.S. domination abroad. We have to break down the myth of American benevolence, and challenge the privilege most Americans enjoy as residents of the global hegemon. Ending the fear and hatred of foreigners felt by most Americans is a key part of this battle.

These culture wars can’t be won at the polls. It’s time for progressives to stop spending so much energy on elections that are already rigged against them and concentrate on community organizing and identity politics. Not the fragmenting racial identity politics of the early ’90s, but a universal cultural politics demanding equality and acceptance for all cultural practices except those that violate these principles. Hatred of gays and foreigners is what won this election for the Republicans, and until we face this hatred squarely and force it into oblivion the Republicans are going to keep on winning.

What to do about nationalism and electoralism

Justin Podur, a Canadian writer for ZNet, posted recently about two important topics for the left to think about: nationalism and electoralism.

I added my thoughts about nationalism in the comments to his post. The left has historically been internationalist in its rhetoric, but anti-imperialist movements and communist revolutions have almost always governed in distinctly nationalist ways when they came to power, generally to the great harm of their people. But would their success have been possible without nationalism to mobilize support? Do the gains they make outweigh the damage their nationalism does?

On electoralism I spelled out my thoughts in this article. While I'm ultimately opposed to representative "democracy", I also think electoral strength is an important means to a more progressive society. Yet the electoral system isn't much use to us as long as we remain weak in our ability to mobilize people or money. So the priority should be building social movements, community organizations, and democratic businesses. If that can be done thru electoral organizing, fine. But that should always be the focus, and mustn't be lost in the strange obsession many leftists have in figuring out who to vote for (as if one vote matters).